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Centrally planned Beveridge healthcare systems typically rely heavily on local or regional “health au-
thorities” as responsible organisations for the care of geographically deﬁned populations. The frequency
of reorganisations in the English NHS suggests that there is no compelling unitary deﬁnition of what
constitutes a good healthcare geography. In this paper we propose a set of desirable objectives for an
administrative healthcare geography, speciﬁcally: geographical compactness, co-extensiveness with
current local authorities and size and population homogeneity, and we show how these might be
operationally measured. Based on these objectives, we represent the problem of how to partition a
territory into health authorities as a multi-objective optimisation problem. We use a state-of-the-art
multi-objective genetic algorithm customised for the needs of our study to partition the territory of
the East England into 14 Primary Care Trusts and 50 GP consortia and study the tradeoffs between
objectives which this reveals.
 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
One of the more depressing features of health policy in publicly
funded systems is the frequency with which reorganisations take
place, redeﬁning institutional roles, centralising what was previ-
ously decentralised (or vice versa), splitting or consolidating
different delivery organisations, and so on [1]. These reorganisa-
tions have a substantial impact on the careers of healthcare
workers, and on the quality of care experienced by patients, and so
it seems desirable that they should be informed by the best possible
evidence and science.
The current paper aims to provide a basis for more rational
decision making around one aspect of reorganisation, namely the
deﬁnition of geographically based entities which we call health
authorities (“HAs”). We do not seek to prescribe whether De-
partments of Health undertake reorganisations. However, should a
decision be made to reorganise, one might at least hope that the
reorganisation will be made in a systematic and methodical
manner. We present a multi-objective framework for making thisfax: þ44 020 7955 6885.
p@rediffmail.com (D. Datta),
mail.com (A.M. Gourtani),
All rights reserved.sort of decision, and demonstrate a powerful multi-objective
optimisation-based technology which can support such decisions.
Our analysis applies in particular to Beveridge systems, that is to
say, National Health Service-type systems, rather than social in-
surance or health savings account systems. In such systems,
administrative geography plays a critically important role. Typi-
cally, government funds are disbursed through geographically
deﬁned HAs, often according to a funding formula, which attempts
to correct for differences in need between HA resident populations
[2,3]. These entities are then responsible for providing care for their
populations, either through hospitals and other acute facilities
which they operate themselves or which they purchase from
healthcare providers.
We will refer to a partitioning of a territory into HAs as a
“healthcare geography”. The question of how big these constituent
units should be has been much debated in the literature [4e6], but
not conclusively. Bojke, Gravelle andWilkin’s [5] view that “despite
the importance of the issue of organisational size, the evidence
available from published research is limited both in quantity and
relevance” still seems to be true. However, the question e What
constitutes a good healthcare geography?e seems to have received
even less attention. In this paper, we tackle this more fundamental
question directly. Having listed at the conceptual level some
candidate attractive characteristics (“objectives”), we then turn our
attention to the construction of metrics to operationalise these
D. Datta et al. / Socio-Economic Planning Sciences 47 (2013) 247e257248objectives, and formulate the question of how a territory should be
partitioned up into HAs as a multi-objective problem. A multi-
objective problem is a generalisation of an optimisation problem
in which there are several conﬂicting objective rather than a single
uncontested one. Rather than having optimal solutions, such a
problem has (Pareto) efﬁcient solutions: by deﬁnition, no efﬁcient
solution is better than another on all objectives. Then, for the
empirical part of the paper, we turn our attention to revealing the
tradeoffs imposed by an actual healthcare geography, in this case
the geography of the East of England.
Because this problem is computationally intractable, we use a
state-of-the-art multi-objective genetic algorithm customised for
the needs of our study. Conceptually a multi-objective genetic al-
gorithm works as follows. We have a very large set of feasible so-
lutions, characterised in some suitable way and are interested in
identifying efﬁcient solutions. We proceed as illustrated in Fig. 1,
which shows points located in a bi-objective space: we wish to
minimise these objectives. First, we identify a set of starting solu-
tions, shown as white circles. We perform certain operations on
these solutions in order to identify a new set of better solutions (the
grey circles). We iterate these operations and obtain the solutions
represented by the black circles. If we iterate sufﬁciently, and our
operations are deﬁned appropriately, we will obtain a set of solu-
tions which are efﬁcient (or very close to being efﬁcient) and which
are widely distributed in the objective space.
Our paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the
current administrative healthcare geography of England, and some
conﬂicting objectives by which it might be judged; in Section 3, we
present the formulation of our multi-objective problem, our data
sources, and solution method; in Section 4, we present results
obtained from applying this model to a particular healthcare ge-
ography, namely that of the East of England; in Section 5, we
conclude.2. Background to the English system
In England, most healthcare is delivered by the government,
funded out of general taxation. Health services are provided
through the National Health Service (NHS): at time of writing,
within the NHS there are two principal tiers of organisations with
jurisdiction over geographically deﬁned territories: Strategic
Health Authorities (SHAs) at the top level and Primary Care TrustsFig. 1. Schematic illustration of a multi-objective genetic algorithm.(PCTs) at the second level. SHAs have a planning, coordination and
monitoring role, and are effectively a local arm of the Department
of Health; their structure almost exactly mirrors that of Govern-
ment Ofﬁce Regions. Primary Care Trusts or PCTs, of which there are
152, have responsibility for the delivery of healthcare to a
geographically deﬁned population. They directly control some 80%
of the NHS budget and purchase health services from other NHS
organisations, on behalf of their populations [7].
Recently, the incoming Conservative-Liberal coalition govern-
ment has announced its intention to dissolve these structures [8,9].
In the future, PCTs and SHAs will no longer exist and funds will ﬂow
directly to consortia of General Practitioners (GPs) who will take
over the commissioning of health services from Primary Care
Trusts. The size of these GP consortia is not clear at the time of
writing: however, it seems likely that the consortia will be smaller
than PCTs, as the motivation for the change is to bring money closer
to the individual patient. The critical questions of how money is to
be allocated to GP consortia and howperformance is to bemanaged
under the new arrangements, have not been answered in any
detailed way. This is not a trivial issue, as the heterogeneity of PCTs
make both resource allocation and comparison of performance
major analytic challenges. The statistical difﬁculties associated with
devising performance management systems and resource alloca-
tion formulas for smaller and more diverse entities will represent a
substantial challenge for analysts.
We suggest that one reason for the repeated reorganisations
which have been a feature of life in the NHS in recent years might
be that the question of what characterises a good system of HAs is
intrinsically a multi-objective one. If this is the case, perennial
dissatisfaction is to be expected e immediately after a reorganisa-
tion driven by some one particular objective, the failings of the new
conﬁguration with respect to all the other objectives will rapidly
become apparent. Moreover, it is in the nature of policy processes
in large bureaucratic organisations that even in the course of the
same reorganisation, different objectives will be invoked by
different actors to justify reorganisations in different parts of the
system, resulting in an overall reconﬁguration which cannot
coherently be justiﬁed with respect to any set of objectives.
This paper deals with an aspect of the organisation of a
healthcare system, namely the partitioning of a territory into HAs to
form a “healthcare geography”. We propose that there are four
broad characteristics of a healthcare geographywhichmake it more
or less attractive. We will refer to these as the “objectives”. They
are:
O1. HAs should be geographically compact. As the HA is a single
administrative unit and as health services are delivered at
multiple points, staff or providers of commissioned services
may be required to travel within the HA. Geographical
compactness is attractive because it minimises travel distances.
To make the point in a stylised manner, consider two HAs with
area of 10,000 square miles, one of which, A, is constructed as a
(compact) 100mile square, the other of which, B, is constructed
as a (non-compact) 10  1000 mile rectangle. The greatest
point to point distance in HA A is 100
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
or 141 miles
whereas the greatest distance in HA B is clearly in excess of
1000 miles.
O2. HAs’ boundaries should be roughly coextensive with other
geographically deﬁned entities with which they have dealings,
for example local authorities. This is often cited as an objective
for the design of HAs e for example the 2006 White Paper Our
Health, our care, our say [10] (which lays down the rationale for
the reorganisation of the English National Health Service in
2006) notes that providing “for PCT [i.e. HA] boundaries to be
the same as those of local authorities with social services
a) High compactness  b) Low Compactness 
Health authority
minimal external peripheral 
Fig. 2. Examples of high and low compactness.
D. Datta et al. / Socio-Economic Planning Sciences 47 (2013) 247e257 249responsibilities, which would make it easier to achieve better
integration of health and social care” is a desirable feature of a
geography. (This cannot be the onlyobjective as far as theWhite
Paper is concerned since the post-2006 PCT structure does
differ from the local authority structure in some respects: the
White Paper is not very explicit about why this should be so.)
O3. HAs should be of the same size, for some suitable deﬁnition of
“size” (e.g. population, value of spend). Reorganisations of HAs
typically take place because HAs are deemed to be either “too
big” or “too small”. This seems to have been a major consid-
eration in the 2006 reorganisation of the English NHS, which
saw the number of HAs reduced from 303 to 152, and thus the
size of the average PCT effectively doubled. Arguments for
decreasing size often centre around, for example, the need of a
PCT to be responsive to local needs, as large bodies are
generally regarded as being excessively remote and bureau-
cratic; arguments for increasing size centre around the need
for PCTs to reap economies of scale and pool ﬁnancial risks e
see Ref. [5] for an overview of competing arguments. Thus,
planning tends to be predicated on the notion of an optimal HA
size and deviations from that optimal size are likely to be
frowned on (although identifying that optimal size is itself a
multicriteria decision, based on weighing arguments for
increasing against arguments for decreasing size). Moreover,
different HA functions may have different optimal scales e
while even a small HA may have a sufﬁciently large number of
childbirths per year and thus be able to cost-effectively
maintain the expertise to commission maternity services, the
volume of demand may not justify maintaining specialist
expertise on gender reassignment surgery. Thus decisions
about what the statutory responsibilities of HAs are to be, and
what responsibilities are to be reserved at the central level, are
problematic if HAs differ markedly in size.
O4. HAs should be broadly comparable in terms of population
characteristics which drive morbidity or cost of service for
purposes of performance measurement and resource alloca-
tion. From an administrative point of view, a major difﬁculty in
resource allocation to HAs is calculating the amount which an
HA “needs” to provide services for a population with a given
mix of population characteristics. A population which is
disproportionately elderly presumably will consume more
medical services than one which is disproportionately young,
but how much? The statistical issues which arise in making
this sort of quantitative needs assessment are extremely tricky,
and results are notoriously sensitive to apparently innocuous
technical assumptions [2]. Designing HAs so that they are as
similar in population mix as possible would neatly sidestep
this problem e at the extreme if all HAs have identical popu-
lation mix and size, a fair allocation would be simply to give
each PCT the same amount of money.
In the next section wewill discuss how these ideas can be made
operational in a way which helps in the design of a healthcare
geography.
3. Framework for analysis
3.1. Formulation
Our approach to the issue under study will be a multi-objective
programming one. A multi-objective program is a generalisation of
a mathematical program or optimisation problem, which has
several objective functions rather than one [11e13]. Because not all
objectives can be simultaneously optimised, i.e., no single solution
exists which is simultaneously at least as good or better on allobjectives, the appropriate solution concept for a multi-objective
program is the set of efﬁcient solutions, i.e. those for which no
solution exists which is simultaneously at least as good or better on
all objectives.
First we describe the characteristics of the set of possible solu-
tions. We deﬁne the elementary geographic units composing the
territory of England as wards. We then represent the territory of
interest as an undirected and planar graph called the contiguity
graph G(V, E), where V ¼ {v1,v2,.,vn} denotes the set of n nodes
representingwards (elementary units) and E¼ {eij:i,j¼ 1,2,.,n;is j}
denotes the set of edges, where eij ¼ 1 if the nodes vi and vj are
connected and eij¼ 0 otherwise. Therefore, twowards are connected
with an edge only if they are adjacent in the map.
Furthermore, we deﬁne the following sets of attributes as node
weights:
 P ¼ {p1,p2,.,pn} denotes the set of populations of each ward.
 A ¼ {a1,a2,.,an} denotes the set of areas of each ward in Km2.
 U ¼ {u1,u2,.,un} denotes set of numbers of unemployed
(excluding economically inactive) of each ward.
 O ¼ {o1,o2,.,on} denotes the set of numbers of people aged
above 65 within each ward.
It is assumed that the desired number of HAs within the terri-
tory of interest has been determined and is denoted by N. There-
fore, the task is to divide G by grouping its n nodes into N non-
empty and disjoint HAs. A partition of G is denoted by
X ¼ {x1,x2,.,xN}, where xi is a set of nodes corresponding to HA i.
We then deﬁne the desired set of feasible partitions of G to satisfy
the following constraints:
C1 Contiguity: the wards within each HA should be adjacent to
each other i.e. within a HA there should not be a node discon-
nected from other nodes.
C2 Integrity: each ward should belong to one and only one HA. In
other words, HAs should not overlap.
C3 Size of a HA: the number of wards within each HA should be
within a deﬁned range i.e. between some speciﬁed Lmin and
Lmax.
The objective functions which we will seek to optimise are as
follows. Objective functions F1, F2, and F3 correspond to objectives
O1, O2, and O3 outlined in the previous section. We operationalise
O4 through two objective functions, F4 and F5, one of which is
related to age and the other to economic activity.
F1 Compactness. Compactness reﬂects an aspiration that HAs
should be closer to being ball-shared or circular. The idea is best
understood graphically: see Fig. 2 for a representation of high and
low compactness. Some sort of compactness concept features
extensively in geographic partitioning and districting problems in
social sciences and several methods for measuring compactness
have been considered [14,15]; the measure we use is in line with
common practice. Formally, supposing AR(xi) for i ¼ 1,2,.,N de-
notes the total area of HA i ði:e: P
j˛xi
ajÞ and AR(xi) for i ¼ 1,2,.,N
denotes the area of the wards whose centroids fall within the
1 http://www.nomisweb.co.uk/.
D. Datta et al. / Socio-Economic Planning Sciences 47 (2013) 247e257250smallest circle enclosing the centroids of all wards in HA i, we
measure the compactness of HA i as:
Ci ¼
ARðxiÞ
ARðxiÞ
(1)
Consequently, themeasure of compactness for a HA takes a value
in the interval (0,1). The objective function is therefore to minimise
the average HA’s deviation from the maximum compactness:
Minimise : F1 ¼ 1
N
XN
i¼1
ð1 CiÞ (2)
F2 Co-extensiveness with Local Authority boundaries: It is
desirable that HAs have common boundaries with a limited num-
ber of local authorities. This co-extensiveness presents advantages
such as reducing administrative costs, creating shared knowledge
and values, and more effective regional planning and decision
making through the cooperation of local authorities with HAs [16].
We measure this co-extensiveness by measuring the degree to
which a HA overlaps with different local authorities. To build the
measure, rank the m(i) local authorities in a HA i by the number of
wards belonging to that local authority, in decreasing order. Call
these local authorities l1.lm(i). Deﬁne the number of wards in i
belonging to local authority lj as wij. Call the total number of wards
in i, Wi. Deﬁne MðxiÞ ¼
P
j¼1;.;mðiÞ
jwij=Wi and construct the
objective function as follows:
Minimise : F2 ¼ 1
N
XN
i¼1
ðMðxiÞÞ (3)
F3 Size Homogeneity: The purpose of HAs is to make decisions
on behalf of a local population, and as such, if they become too big,
they become distant from that population. At the same time,
because of ﬁxed running costs, small HAs may not be ﬁnancially
viable. We incorporate the requirement that HAs should be neither
too big or to small through this objective. We minimise the devi-
ation of population size between HAs:
Minimise : F3 ¼ 1
N
XN
i¼1

P  PðxiÞ
P
 (4)
where the population of HA i is deﬁned as PðxiÞ ¼
P
j˛xi
pj and the
average population of HAs is deﬁned as P ¼ 1=NPNi¼1ðPðxiÞÞ.
F4 Population Age Homogeneity: We propose a measure for
homogenising the population of people above 65 years old across
HAs, by minimising the deviation of the ratio of Over 65’s between
HAs and formulate this objective as follows:
Minimise : F4 ¼ 1
N
XN
i¼1

RO ROðxiÞ
RO
 (5)
where the number of over 65’s in HA i is OðxiÞ ¼
P
j˛xi
oj, the rate of
over 65’s in i is RO(xi) ¼ O(xi)/P(xi) and the average rate of over 65’s
across HAs is RO ¼ 1=NPNi¼1ðROðxiÞÞ.
F5 Population Economic Homogeneity: In this study, we choose
unemployment as the variable representing the deprivation level
and aim to homogenise the HAs with respect to unemployment by
minimising the deviation of their ratio of unemployed people (f5)
between HAs:Minimise : F5 ¼ 1
N
XN
i¼1

RU  RUðxiÞ
RU
 (6)
where the number of unemployed people in HA i is UðxiÞ ¼
P
j˛xi
uj,
the unemployment rate in i is RU(xi) ¼ U(xi)/P(xi), and the average
unemployment rate across HAs is RU ¼ 1=NPNi¼1ðRUðxiÞÞ.
The socio-economic data we use comes from the UK 2001
census. This data includes the Census Area Statistics (CAS) Ward
level information on population, unemployment rates and number
of people aged 65 and over for the electoral wards in the studied
regions. This data has been obtained from NOMIS, a service of the
Ofﬁce of National Statistics (ONS).1 Although somewhat out of date,
the data is adequate for our current purposes which are to
demonstrate the methodology and provide broad insight. The
geographic spatial data on centroid coordinates, boundaries (used
to compute the contiguity graph) and areas of studied electoral
wards has been accessed through EDINA UKBORDERS and is
available only for 2003 CAS wards. Due to the merger of a few
wards in 2002, there are some differences between the datasets,
and we have performed the reconciliation manually.
The objectives which we propose here are not uniquely
compelling: for example, instead of (or as well as) co-extensiveness
with local authorities, one could propose co-extensiveness with
mental health trusts or ambulance trusts; instead of (or as well as)
homogenising the elderly or unemployed population, one could
homogenise population from a given socio-economic group, or the
urban/rural mix. However, the objectives we have chosen are
illustrative of the type of objectives which might be selected in a
problem such as this. There is also a question of how aggregate or
disaggregate objectives are: for example, economic and age popu-
lation characteristics could be combined into a single index of need.
However, our algorithm scales well with number of criteria and so
we have taken advantage of this by decomposing the comparability
objective O4 into two constituent objective functions.
3.2. Solution method
Solving multi-objective programs exactly is very challenging
computationally and solving the problem outlined in the previous
section exactly for a country the size of England is practically
impossible with current optimisation technology. However, the
computational difﬁculties associatedwithmulti-objective programs
have led to the development of variousmeta-heuristicmethods with
the aim of approximating and searching for efﬁcient solutionswhich
are both close to the true Pareto front and have a high diversity with
respect to different objectives. These methods have a good track
record of producing solutions, although the solutions do not come
with optimality guarantees (as is the case with a classical optimisa-
tion method, such as the simplex method for linear programming).
The integer-coded multi-objective GA, proposed by Datta et al.
[15] for partitioning a geographical territory into a given number of
zones, is applied for solving the problem at our hand. It is a cus-
tomised version of the multi-objective GA proposed in Ref. [15] as
NSGA-II. NSGA-II is a general-purpose algorithm and it is custom-
ised here towork speciﬁcally for the partitioning problem only. The
customisation is made by replacing the general-purpose operators
of the original NSGA-II with special operators designed by incor-
porating the partitioning related information. To be speciﬁc, a so-
lution of the GA is an array of n wards of the territory, where the
value of an element of the array is the HA to which the representing
Fig. 4. An illustration of the mutation operation.
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starting with an excessive number of infeasible (invalid) solutions,
a greedy algorithm is applied here for initialising feasible (valid) or
near feasible solutions by forcibly satisfying constraints as much
possible. In this technique, a HA is ﬁrst formed with a single
random ward and then it is expanded to the neighbouring wards,
which have not yet been included in any other HA. The expansion is
continued until the permitted maximum size of the HA is obtained
or all the wards are exhausted.
After the solutions have been initialised, the crowded tourna-
ment selection operator [17] is applied to the GA population of
solutions. This operator selects two random solutions at a time, and
a copy of the best one, based on the convergence and diversity of
the solutions, is stored in a temporary population, known as a
mating pool. A specially designed crossover operator for parti-
tioning problem draws two random solutions from the mating pool
and generates a new solution by inserting some random HAs from
one parent solution into another. It also takes care of any over-
lapping, during this insertion, by relabelling the partially over-
lapped HAs as well as other HAs. Then, a partition-based mutation
operator is applied to the solutions generated by the crossover
operator. Since various objectives of our problem can be achieved
only by balancing the sizes of the HAs, the mutation operator is
engaged to alter the sizes of HAs by shifting a random outer ward of
a HA to one of its boundary HAs.
We illustrate how the ideas of the crossover and mutation op-
erators play out in the context of our problemwith a small example
(see Fig. 3.). In this example, we wish to partition a territory con-
sisting of 21 wards into four HAs. To demonstrate the crossover
operations, we have identiﬁed two solutions (chromosomes),
which we call Parent 1 and Parent 2. We form a new solution by
taking T3 from Parent 2 and inserting it into Parent 1, but this
means that HAs P2eP4 are no longer viable (because T3 overlaps
with all of them, violating the integrity constraint C2) and the so-
lution has to be repaired, resulting in the creation of new HAs Q2
and Q3. In a similar way, another new solution can be generated
from Parent 2 by inserting to it a HA from Parent 1.
As well as crossover, a mutation operator allows for a small
chance of mutation. It searches through all small changes withinFig. 3. An illustration of thchromosomes, and if a HA is selected for mutation, it will shift a
boundary node of the HA i.e. increase the size of the HA by
decreasing the size of its neighbour. This processwill alter the size of
the HAs to make solutions more diverse. Fig. 4 shows an illustration
of mutation operation, where for the offspring 1 the boundary of P1
is shifted into Q3 and the newly created HAs are relabelled.
In order to make the GA converge faster, a problem-speciﬁc
mechanism is applied for repairing an infeasible solution. Since
an element of the considered solution array represents a ward of
the territory and it is assigned only one value as the HA of the
representing ward, the ward integrity constraint is automatically
satisﬁed. If the HA contiguity constraint is violated under the pro-
posed crossover operator, it is taken care of by a labelling mecha-
nism by relabelling a disconnected portion of a HA as a new HA.e crossover operation.
Fig. 5. Pareto front for a two-objective subproblem.
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initialization/generation of a solution. Therefore, the repairing
mechanism is applied here for steering an infeasible solution to the
feasible region, as much as possible. Firstly it attempts to satisfy the
minimum HA size, in which an undersized HA is eliminated by
merging its wards in one or more adjacent HA(s). The process is
continued until all such HAs are eliminated or the number of HAs
reaches its lower limit. This process, however, involves the draw-
back of generating oversized HAs during the elimination of smaller
HAs. Therefore, as the ﬁnal step, the repairing mechanism attempts
to reduce an oversized HA by merging some of its outer wards in
adjacent HAs, if they have the capacity to take more wards.
If the above mechanism fails to repair an infeasible solution, the
penalty-parameterless constraint handling approach [18], is
applied to take care of an infeasible solution. It ﬁrst makes an
infeasible solution inferior to any feasible solution by assigning it a
ﬁtness value, then all the feasible and infeasible solutions are
handled as feasible solutions only. Finally, the convergence and
diversity based elite preserving mechanism [17] is applied in order
to carry good solutions over generations. In this mechanism, both
the parent and children populations of a generation are combined,
and the combined solutions are sorted according to their quality
measured in terms of their convergence and diversity. Then, the
ﬁrst 50% of the best solutions are extracted from the combined
population for forming a new population for the next generation.
This mechanism guarantees that, even if no good solution is
generated at a generation, the GA never moves opposite to the
optimum from the current position.
The proposed GA procedure is coded in C programming lan-
guage. All computations are performed on a Dell Latitude 120L with
an Intel Celeron chip (1.5 GHz) and 256 MB of memory, running
on Linux Environment (Debian Release 5.0.4). The resulting maps
are plotted by the ArcGIS 10 software.
4. Results and discussion
4.1. Characteristics of the East of England
Despite the effectiveness of the Genetic Algorithm in solving
multi-objective problems, applying it to the health partitioning of
the entire territory of England consisting of above 8000 wards
would be computationally very demanding. For this reason, we
focus on East England, which is one of the nine ofﬁcial government
regions of England and also corresponds to East of England SHA.
East England consists of:
 6 Non-metropolitan counties: Norfolk, Cambridgeshire, Hert-
fordshire, Suffolk, Essex and Bedfordshire (which in turn
contain 48 districts);
 4 Unitary Authorities (UAs): Luton, Petersbrough, Thurrock and
Southend-on-Sea.
While the counties cover large areas of mostly thinly populated
countryside and have multiple districts, the UAs are smaller and
contain highly dense cities and towns. At the lowest level of the
subdivision hierarchy, there are 1118 electoral wards.
The territory of the East of England covers an area of 19,120 km2
and has a population of about 5.6 million people. The density of
population varies signiﬁcantly across this region and is much
higher in cities and towns than in rural areas and in the South than
in the North. The density is highest in Luton Unitary Authority with
4400 people per km2 and lowest in West Norfolk with about 100
people per km2. This region has a higher proportion of people
above 65 years of age (16.8%) than the England average (16.0%). The
ratio of the population over 65 is much higher in north rural areaand lower in the cities and southern region. Economically speaking,
East England is one of the most prosperous regions in England with
an overall high level of education and employment in comparison
with the other regions. However this is not the case for all areas
across the region and the unemployment rate (as a measure of
deprivation) is generally higher in the North than South.
East England currently consists of 14 PCTs. Initial inspection of
the PCT maps suggests that the current boundaries have been set
with an emphasis on the co-extensiveness of PCTs to current local
authority boundaries (although Great Yarmouth and Waveney
crosses county boundaries and both South East and South West
Sussex both contain a unitary authority and a slice of Sussex
county), and to some degree on the compactness of HAs. However,
at least at ﬁrst glance, there is little evidence of taking size ho-
mogeneity and deprivation and health equality measures into ac-
count in setting the boundaries. Some extreme examples are
Norfolk and Suffolk, where the high levels of compactness and co-
extensiveness with local authorities result in a high ratio of both
unemployed and people over 65. Also, Peterborough and Luton
have the same local authority and PCT areas, but this has been
achieved at the expense of their low population sizes in comparison
with the rest of PCTs.4.2. Primary Care Trusts in the East of England
The ﬁrst question which we examine is the efﬁciency of the
existing partitioning of the territory of the East of England into 14
HAs (“Primary Care Trusts”). In answering this question, we took
“local authority coextensiveness” to refer to co-extensiveness with
thecounties orunitaryauthorities of theEast of England (there are 10
of these, and so they are on average roughly the same size as PCTs).
The ﬁnal output of the algorithm is a set of solutions (partitions),
which approximates the Pareto front, in which each solution is
strictly better than others at least in one objective value. For
conciseness, we will refer to such solutions as “efﬁcient solutions”.
In general, it is hard to visualise these solutions, as to do so requires
the visualisation of a points in 5-dimensional objective space.
Hence, to illustrate some concepts, we present in Fig. 5, the results
of a run for a two-dimensional subproblem using only objectives F1
and F3, compactness and size homogeneity. As can be seen from
this ﬁgure, the set of efﬁcient solutions forms an approximate
Pareto front. This front may exhibit non-convexities in places,
because even though a solution may be dominated by a convex
combination of solutions, that convex combination may not be
available because assignment of a ward to a Health Authority is a
binary, zero-one choice. These sorts of non-convexities make this
Table 1
Performance of modelled and actual solutions which minimise each objective
function.
Performance on objectives
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5
F1 Minimising solution 0.193758 1.249826 0.374486 0.134275 0.121036
F2 Minimising solution 0.339323 1.057024 0.434728 0.14088 0.141073
F3 Minimising solution 0.464833 1.252778 0.011724 0.118701 0.112224
F4 Minimising solution 0.540031 1.392056 0.389039 0.046924 0.155495
F5 Minimising solution 0.527363 1.255544 0.357812 0.135937 0.039829
Compromise 0.419658 1.335425 0.271771 0.118175 0.117945
Actual 0.304887 1.082654 0.343147 0.13634 0.183611
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methods which we use in this paper.
Turning now to our main run, we ran our algorithm for 10,000
generations of a population of 100 solutions, taking 7 h and 40 min.
In Table 1 we display the performance of the efﬁcient solutions
which obtain theminimumvalues on each of the objectives (for the
solutionwhichminimises Fx, we have highlighted the score for thatFig. 6. Value path for efﬁcient solutions.
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Co
rre
la
tio
n 
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
Number of  PCTs
F1-F2
F1-F3
F1-F4
F1-F5
F2-F3
F2-F4
F2-F5
F3-F4
F3-F5
F4-F5
Fig. 7. Correlations between objective performance of efﬁcient solutions for 10e20
PCTs in the East of England.
Fig. 8. Value path for 100 efﬁcient solutions for CS and DS scenarios compare.solution on Fx in bold), along with a compromise solution which
secures good values on all objectives (but exceptional values on
none). We also show the performance of the actual implemented
partition of the East of England into Primary Care Trusts. It can be
seen that the current implemented partition appears quite close to
the solution which minimises F2, local authority coextensiveness.
Indeed, the F2 minimising solution, although it is slightly better
than the actual implemented solution on F2, only achieves this by
worse performance on F3 (population homogeneity) and F4 (age
homogeneity). So it appears, if we want to partition the East of
England into 14 HAs, the current allocation seems to be a relatively
efﬁcient way of doing so, albeit one which places a relatively high
weight on local authority coextensiveness.
Fig. 6 shows the performance of each solution in the family of
efﬁcient solutions at termination as a so-called “value path” [11].
The value on the axes represents the spread of solutions for each
objective and demonstrates the diversity of efﬁcient solutions. The
extent to which cross lines zigzag shows the sharpness2 of the
trade-off of objective values between different efﬁcient solutions.
Recalling that the objective functions are to be minimised, it can
be seen from Fig. 6 that efﬁcient solutions which performwell on F1
(compactness) also perform well on F2 (local authority co-
extensiveness). This makes intuitive sense: as local authorities are
themselves compact, Primary Care Trusts which are coextensive
with local authorities will also be compact. There appears to be a
very sharp trade-off between co-extensiveness (F2) and size ho-
mogeneity (F3). Again this is not surprising as local authorities
range in size by almost an order of magnitude: Essex has 1,310,836
people, while Thurrock has a population of 143,099. Similarly, good
performance on F4 (age homogeneity) seems to be associated with2 What is meant by a “sharp” tradeoff here is a situationwhere good performance
on one criterion can only be attained at the cost of poor performance on another
criterion; a blunt tradeoff is one where relatively good performance on one crite-
rion does not preclude relatively good performance on another criterion thus for a
problem with two dimensions, {(1,0),(0,1)} is a solution set which exhibits a sharp
tradeoff and {(1,0),(0.8,0.7),(0.7,0.8) (0,1)} exhibits a “blunt” tradeoff in this sense.
Fig. 9. Comparison between GP consortia and local authorities in East England.
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F5 (economic homogeneity).
A complementary perspective on the structural characteristics of
the solutions is given by computing the correlation matrix for the
solutions in the population at termination. We show in Fig. 7 the
correlations between different objective values when we run our
algorithm 12 times in order to partition East of England up into
9,10,11,. through to 20 PCTs. (For reasons of time constraintswe run
the algorithm for only 1000 generations and about 25min each time,
and a population of 50 solutions). It can be seen that the insights of
the previous paragraph are borne out in this display: however many
PCTs we partition the East of England into, there is always a strong
positive correlation between performance on F1 compactness and F2
local authority coextensiveness (for convenience we have marked the
data series for these correlations with squares); and there is almost
always a negative correlation between performance on F1 and F3
(marked with circles), except when the number of PCTs is 12, when
there is a slight positive correlation. Other patterns do exist in this
dataset: for example it is striking that apart from the F1eF2 pair,
there are no other pairs of criteria which consistently exhibit strong
positive correlation. This suggests that there are indeed in general
sharp tradeoffs betweencriteria, andvalidatesourclaim that amulti-
objective approach is appropriate here.4.3. GP consortia in the East of England
The second question we examine is how the East of England
might be partitioned into smaller GP consortia. Although GP con-
sortia are deﬁned primarily by the participating GP practices, they
nevertheless will have geographical responsibility, e.g. in order to
ensure that someone has responsibility for the care of unregistered
patients, and GP consortia have to identify the area for which they
will be responsible in their constitution [19].3 According to GP
Newspaper [20] the size of the six pilot GP consortia in Cumbria is
about 100,000. This is comparable with the size of the seven
pathﬁnder GP consortia in the East of England, announced as this
paper was in preparation, which have an average size of 146,000,3 Para 4.16 and 4.40.according to the ﬁgures in Department of Health [21]. Working on
this basis, therewould be approximately 50 GP consortia in the East
of England. We note that this is at the lower end of the scale sug-
gested by the Department of Health [18],4 but consortia are likely to
be smaller in the East of England than the national average due to
the predominantly rural nature of much of the region.
Co-extensiveness with local authorities remains important in
this environment, and indeed has two possible interpretations: we
could seek to make the GP consortia co-extensive either with the
counties and unitary local authorities (the county scenario, CS),
with the districts (the district scenario, DS). There are reasons why
GP consortia might want to work collaboratively with either tier of
local government: for example, counties deliver social care, which
requires close coordination with healthcare delivery, but district
councils have environmental and health and safety responsibilities.
We ran our algorithm for 10,000 generations of a population of
100 solutions. We compare the efﬁcient solutions of CS and DS in
order to observe the impact of local authority co-extensiveness
level on the shape of our health authorities (Fig. 8). As would be
expected from the construction of this index, the co-extensiveness
with local authority objective function (F2) has a better value for
county level than district level solutions (as there are fewer op-
portunities to violate co-extensiveness with counties than with
districts). Solutions in the DS scenario which perform well on co-
extensiveness with local authorities can be seen to perform badly
on the age and unemployment homogeneity objectives (F4 and F5
respectively) relative to the CS scenario. At the same time many of
the solutions under the DS scenario are amongst the best in terms
of population homogeneity (F3) and seem also to perform quite
well in terms of compactness (F1), so requiring co-extensiveness
with districts has advantages and disadvantages in terms of the
other criteria.
It is interesting to contrast the performance of the F2-extreme
CS scenario (in which the objective F2 is co-extensiveness with
counties) with the F2-extreme DS scenario (in which F2 is co-
extensiveness with districts). These are shown in Fig. 9, with the4 Para 4.21.
Table 2
Interobjective correlations for three different algorithm runs with different co-
extensiveness deﬁnitions.
Objective pairs DS CS HN
F1eF2 0.844 0.746 0.607
F1eF3 0.585 0.022 0.493
F1eF4 0.594 0.364 0.359
F1eF5 0.536 0.622 0.633
F2eF3 0.577 0.144 0.607
F2eF4 0.433 0.402 0.613
F2eF5 0.764 0.715 0.836
F3eF4 0.284 0.44 0.086
F3eF5 0.158 0.303 0.39
F4eF5 0.043 0.054 0.328
Fig. 10. Pareto front for bi-criteria run with two co-extensiveness criteria.
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showing counties or local authorities respectively.
As can be seen, in the CS scenario our algorithm has performed
well in securing a structure of consortia which are consistent with
county boundaries, whereas in the DS scenario this has provedFig. 11. Two extreme solutionsmore difﬁcult. Recalling that the algorithm run times are the same
in both the CS and DS cases, this is reﬂective of the difﬁculty in
securing a satisfactory allocation which is district-coextensive. A
qualitative message to planners (and GPs) might be that if one
constrains oneself with respect to the more granular district (as
opposed to county) structure, the harder it will be to secure other
objectives.
So far in our discussion of the co-extensiveness objective O2, we
have supposed that the objective is to be co-extensive with local
authority boundaries. However, decision makers may wish a
partition into GP consortia to be coextensive with some other
existing partition based, for example, on the location of acute trusts
(so that GP consortia are able to build relationships knowledge of
and relationships with a single, or small number of acute trusts). In
order to demonstrate this, we computed, for each ward, the closest
(minimum Euclidean distance) hospital. We call the resulting
groupings of wards, “hospital neighbourhoods”, and consider them
to be more appropriate than the traditional “hospital catchments”
which are based on existing patient ﬂows and so may reproduce
current administrative arrangements rather than being reﬂective of
natural patient ﬂows. We re-ran our algorithm one further time in
order to obtain a set of efﬁcient solutions, using co-extensiveness
with this hospital neighbourhood partition as our co-
extensiveness objective (we call this the HN scenario). The inter-
objective correlations of the efﬁcient solutions for this run, as
contrasted with the DS and CS runs, are shown in Table 2. It can be
seen that the interobjective correlations for the HN run are quite
similar to the interobjective correlations for the local authority runs
(in no case is there an interobjective correlation in the HN runwith
opposite sign from the correlations in both the CS and DS runs),
suggesting that the structure of the efﬁcient set is quite similar.
Of course, rather than being motivated to trade a co-
extensiveness objective off against other objectives, the decision
maker may be interested in trading different sorts of co-
extensiveness objectives off against each other. In order to
explore this, we also performed an algorithm run (10,000 genera-
tions) which traded co-extensiveness with hospital neighbour-
hoods against co-extensiveness with county boundaries. Again we
required 50 GP consortia, and allowed consortia to vary in sizefor the bi-objective run.
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bi-objective run is as shown in Fig. 10 and the extreme solutions
which perform best on each of the objectives together with a good
compromise solution, are shown in Fig. 11. The left-hand ﬁgure
shows the extreme partition which performs best on co-
extensiveness with counties, the righthand ﬁgure the extreme
partition which performs best on co-extensiveness with hospital
neighbourhoods. As in Fig. 9, the dark lines show consortia
boundaries and the coloured areas show counties or hospital
neighbourhoods respectively.
It can be seen from the Pareto front that although there are some
candidate solutions which are highly coextensive with either the
county boundaries, or the hospital neighbourhoods, there are no
solutions which are coextensive with both. Indeed, the Pareto front
appears to be fairly linear e there is no “elbow” which might
naturally represent a good compromise solution between these
two conﬂicting desiderata, underlining the need for the decision
maker to think carefully about precise tradeoffs. The maps show
where objectives might conﬂict e for example, a few wards in
north-east Cambridgeshire are closer to a hospital in King’s Lynn in
Norfolk than they are to any hospital in their own county.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have formulated the question of how to
partition a territory into geographically deﬁned commissioning
units as a multi-objective program and solved this program using
state-of-the-art optimisation techniques. The results are (in our
view) insightful. One sample observation is that while tradeoffs
between certain pairs of objectives (such as local authority co-
extensiveness and compactness) may be rather blunt, tradeoffs
between other pairs (such as local authority co-extensiveness and
various sorts of homogeneity in size and population distribution)
may be quite sharp. Another is that while in the past, Primary Care
Trusts have been deﬁned to be more or less contiguous with local
authority boundaries, in the new liberated NHS, this constitutes
less of a constraint on the formation of GP consortia (because of the
smaller size of these entities), if local authority is interpreted to be
county-level authority. At the same time, the statistical difﬁculties
in performance measurement of and resource allocation to GP
consortia, means that homogeneity of the consortia in terms of
their morbidity characteristics, proxied in our model by their age
and employment status, should loom larger. If one constrains GP
consortia by requiring them to be coextensive with local authority
districts, securing a partitioning which is attractive from that point
of view will be that much harder.
The policy position is that GP consortia are to be formed “bot-
tom up” from the grassroots. Nevertheless, there will inevitably by
a role for the centre, whether the Department of Health or the new
Commissioning Board, in ensuring that coverage is complete. It is
very desirable that when the centre intervenes, it does so on a
principled basis, otherwise decisions are will appear unfair, and
may be open to challenge. Models like the one proposed in this
paper can have a role in ensuring that decisions are made on a
consistent basis across the whole of England.
Although our immediate motivation is policy situation in En-
gland, the sort of problem which we analyse is not speciﬁc to this
country. Geographically deﬁned entities play a prominent role in all
Beveridge systems. The question of why these entities are deﬁned
as they are is rarely asked. When it is asked, it is typically answered
in rather unsatisfactory ways, based on political whim or historical
precedent. We show that there is a better way, and these questions
can be brought within the orbit of science.
We also think there are still broader implications, in that this
style of analysis (in particular the use of multi-objectivetechniques) seems to be underused in the health policy and
healthcare management arenas. One of the features of healthcare is
that system objectives are typically contested and particular actors
may focus on one system objective to the exclusion of all others, or
on one objective particularly intensely for a particular period of
time. Forms of analysis which explicitly acknowledge multiple
objectives seem to us to have great potential in sparking more
consensual, reﬂective, and considered decision making.Acknowledgements
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